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Chapter 8
Is Nirvaˉn.a the Same as Insentience? Chinese 
Struggles with an Indian Buddhist Ideal
Robert H. Sharf
Certain forms of perplexity—for example, about freedom, 
knowledge, and the meaning of life—seem to me to 
embody more insight than any of the supposed solutions 
to those problems.
—Thomas Nagel
Preamble
What makes an animate thing animate? How do we know if something is sen-
tient? Is consciousness ultimately material or immaterial? Or is it neither— 
perhaps an “emergent property” that cannot be reduced to or disaggregated from 
a physical substrate?
These are big, complex, and conceptually muddy questions about which phi-
losophers, biologists, and ethicists have had much to say over the millennia. Re-
cently, cognitive psychology has gotten into the act as well, producing hundreds 
of empirical studies on the cognitive foundations of the conceptual distinction we 
make between the animate and inanimate. Studies show that very young children 
have markedly different predispositions (or cognitive intuitions) with regard to 
animate versus inanimate things, intuitions that cannot be explained as the result 
of language acquisition and socialization alone. Newborn infants, for example, 
respond to animate objects differently than they do to inanimate ones: animate 
entities sustain their attention for significantly longer periods of time. And young 
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children have markedly different intuitions about the unseen interiors of objects 
depending upon whether said objects are registered as animate or inanimate.1 The 
growing literature on the subject, representing various disciplinary and method-
ological perspectives, suggests that the animate/inanimate distinction is innate 
rather than acquired.2
“Animacy” or “agency” is not the only cognitive category that appears to be 
hardwired, but it certainly has garnered the lion’s share of attention to date. This 
is owing to the role agency-detection is presumed to play in “theory of mind” on 
the one hand, and in the cross-cultural belief in supernatural agents on the other.
“Theory of mind” refers to the cognitive capacity or insight that allows young 
children to relate to others as conscious subjects rather than mere objects. The 
early acquisition of theory of mind is, according to the “theory-of-mind” theory, 
essential to human empathy and social bonding; a deficiency or impairment in 
this capacity may be responsible for autism spectrum disorders.3 It would seem, 
then, that humans have evolved to distinguish, virtually from birth, animate from 
inanimate things, and as a species we are neurologically predisposed to regard 
animate entities as centers of sentient experience—in Nagel’s terms, “there is 
something it is like to be that organism.”4
Evolutionary theory offers a ready explanation for our innate neurological 
capacity for agency-detection: the ability to instantly register the presence of 
predators in the wild would have had considerable survival value for our prehis-
toric ancestors. But this selective advantage is gained only insofar as the agen-
cy-detection mechanism errs on the side of caution. Is that a tiger I see in the 
bushes? In such ambiguous situations, those who are biased toward false posi-
tives rather than false negatives are more likely to survive. Our agency-detection 
circuit explains, according to some scholars of religion, the widespread but erro-
neous belief that the natural world is populated by spirits, ghosts, ancestors, gods, 
and other supernatural agents. The evolution of a trigger-happy agency-detection 
neural module has become a popular naturalistic explanation for the emergence 
and persistence of religious belief.5
Does the distinction we make between “animate” and “inanimate” correspond 
to an objective fact—something “out there” in the natural world? Or is it merely 
epiphenomenal, a somewhat accidental byproduct of our cognitive evolution? 
The tendency, I believe, is to assume that our agency-detection circuit affords us 
a selective advantage precisely because it attunes us to a natural state of affairs. 
But the relationship between our percepts and what exists in the noumenal world 
is, as philosophers since the “axial age” have pointed out, a complex one, and 
there is reason to suspect that our perception of agency may be epiphenomenal in 
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the same sense that our perception of color or taste or sound is epiphenomenal. 
That is to say, the relationship between the experience of “red” or “bitter” or “eu-
phonious” on the one hand, and the physical and biological conditions that occa-
sion such experiences on the other, is not mimetic in any simple sense; qualia 
such as “red” and “bitter” and “euphonious” do not inhere in the physical, 
mind-independent world.6 In the same way, our visceral apprehension of things as 
animate or inanimate may have survival value for our species, and it may remain 
essential to our interactions as social animals, but this does not in itself warrant 
the distinction as an inherent property of the world.
There is, as it turns out, considerable evidence to support the unnaturalness or 
epiphenomenal status of the animate/inanimate distinction. The world is filled 
with what, borrowing from Bruno Latour, we might call “hybrids,” that is, things 
that don’t fall neatly on one side or the other of the animate/inanimate divide.7 As 
our understanding of biological processes advances, the lines between mineral, 
plant, and animal have come to blur: should acellular agents like viruses or prions 
be considered forms of “life”? Are sponges or fungi or yeasts best classified as 
“plants” or “animals”? And where along this complex evolutionary spectrum 
might we draw the line between sentient and insentient? Our evolutionary devel-
opment, which predisposes us to perceive things as either animate or inanimate, 
may help us elude predators, but it may be misleading when it comes to under-
standing the natural world.
The existence of hybrids that threaten taxonomic order is not the only reason 
to question the naturalness of the animate/inanimate distinction. Introspective re-
flection quickly reveals the conceptual ambiguity of terms like “mind,” “self,” 
“agency,” and “consciousness.” There is little consensus among psychologists, 
philosophers, or cognitive scientists as to the ostensive referent(s), if any, of these 
terms. Social scientists from Durkheim to Marx to Weber to Freud have argued 
that our sense of ourselves as authors of our thoughts, desires, and goals is, to a 
significant extent, a fiction. Many anthropologists would claim that our notions of 
self and identity are in large part culturally and historically determined; at the 
same time philosophers and neuroscientists have argued that we are not, in any 
simple sense, unified and self-determining agents.8
In working through these issues, philosophers have been drawn to various 
“thought experiments” (Gedankenexperimente). Descartes famously used the 
image of the “evil demon” to undermine our certainty about the veracity of the 
sensate world—since we know things only indirectly, through the senses, how do 
we know that what we perceive is real? Times have changed, and science fiction 
has come to replace theology as a source for puzzling but productive “intuition 
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pumps.” Philosophers now ponder “brains in vats” to evoke many of the same 
epistemological puzzles that preoccupied Descartes. They discuss “brain trans-
plants” in order to hone their thinking about selfhood, identity, and embodiment. 
The “Turing test”—a test of a computer’s ability to perfectly emulate human be-
havior—serves as a reference point in debates over behaviorism, determinism, 
and free will. (“Philosophical zombies”—fictional creatures indistinguishable 
from humans except that they lack subjective experience—are used to the same 
effect.) In the fraught debates over qualia, Daniel Dennett has considered a 
“brainstorm machine” that wires the subjective experience of one person into 
another, while Ned Block discusses an “inverted earth”—a planet exactly like the 
earth except that colors are reversed.9 Block has also assayed the “China brain,” a 
thought experiment in which each person in China assumes the role of a distinct 
neuron such that, connected by walkie-talkies, they collectively simulate the ac-
tivity of a single brain.10 (Can this collectivity be said to be “conscious”?) In each 
case, scholars contrive fantastic, entertaining, but implausible scenarios to help 
think through conundrums associated with mind-body dualism, self-identity, de-
terminism, and the ontological status of consciousness. One can imagine scholars, 
some hundreds of years hence, struggling to make sense of earnest tracts on brain 
transplants, philosophical zombies, and the China brain.
In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on 
the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist 
notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, 
much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian 
side, I will begin with the notion of nirodha-samāpatti, a meditative state akin to 
a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class 
of beings known as “beings without conception” (asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ), denizens of 
a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both 
cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, 
which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. 
On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insen-
tient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood 
and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to 
the coherence of Buddhist teachings.
Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent 
but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while 
hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of 
the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can 
dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such 
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theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal 
identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are 
still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought 
experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at 
what the Buddhists might have been up to.11
Nirvaˉn.a, Nirodha, and Insentience
In our earliest surviving Buddhist texts, the notion of nirvāṇa seems pretty 
straightforward: nirvāṇa, which means literally “to blow out” or “extinguish,” 
refers to the permanent cessation of the defilements (kleśa), and the final end to 
suffering and rebirth (saṃsāra).12 There are two kinds, or better yet moments, of 
nirvāṇa: “nirvāṇa with remainder” (sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa) and “nirvāṇa without 
remainder” (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa).13 The nirvāṇa attained by Siddhārtha as he 
sat under the bodhi tree is nirvāṇa with remainder, meaning that even though his 
defilements, and with them all grasping and pain, are forever extinguished, his 
body continues on its natural course. Nirvāṇa without remainder (sometimes 
called parinirvāṇa) refers to the final death of a buddha or arhat from which there 
is no further birth. With this final nirvāṇa the buddha or arhat is finished, annihi-
lated, extinct. Indeed, in early texts this nirvāṇa looks much the same as death 
looks to a modern atheist who does not believe in an afterlife: it is simple annihi-
lation or, if you will, eternal insentience.14
Given the mores of the day, the early Buddhist view of nirvāṇa as cessation 
would have seemed rather austere, grim, stoic. Despite the protests of the Bud-
dhists, their rivals, many of whom were drawn toward a liberation more akin to 
eternal bliss, accused the Buddhists of being nihilists. In the Alagaddūpama-sutta 
the Buddha says:
I have been baselessly, vainly, falsely, and wrongly misrepresented by 
some recluses and brahmins thus: “The recluse Gotama is one who leads 
astray; he teaches the annihilation, the destruction, the extermination of 
an existing being.” As I am not, as I do not proclaim, so have I been base-
lessly, vainly, falsely, and wrongly misrepresented by some recluses and 
brahmins thus.15
Similarly, the Yamaka-sutta opens with the Venerable Yamaka musing: “As I un-
derstand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are 
22289 22289
146 Robert H. Sharf
destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not 
exist after death.” This time it is Sāriputta’s turn to refute the charge. Sāriputta 
explains that it is not the Tathāgata or arahant per se that is annihilated, but rather 
it is the aggregates—all that is impermanent and suffering—that have “ceased 
and passed away.”16 Indeed, the notion that the Buddha taught the “middle 
path”—one of the cornerstones of Buddhism—can be seen in part as a strategy to 
diffuse the charge of nihilism. Again and again the scriptures insist that the Bud-
dha’s middle path rejects both nihilism (uccheda-vāda) and eternalism (śāśva-
ta-vāda). But in claiming, first, that there is no abiding ātman but only a karmically 
conditioned psycho-physical continuum (santāna), and second, that the goal is 
the final extinction of this karmic continuum, Buddhist apologists were left with-
out much wiggle room.
But wiggle they did. One strategy lay in simply insisting that the Buddha’s 
nirvāṇa does not necessarily entail his eternal absence. Nirvāṇa, it was argued, 
only looks like cessation to the unenlightened. In truth, it is beyond thought and 
comprehension. This strategy is put to work in the ten (or fourteen) “undeter-
mined” (avyākṛta) questions—questions on which the Buddha refused to take a 
position. Four of these questions bear on the Tathāgata’s existence after death, 
viz.: Does the Tathāgata exist after death? Or does he not exist after death? Or 
does he both exist and not exist after death? Or does he neither exist nor not exist 
after death?17
Much has been written about the undetermined questions. Did the Buddha 
know the answers but refuse to reveal them because they were unnecessary dis-
tractions not conducive to liberation? Or was the Buddha incapable of answering? 
And if incapable, was it because he did not know the answers? Or because the 
questions themselves were conceptually flawed and thus unanswerable? Or be-
cause his benighted audience did not have the wherewithal to comprehend them? 
Various rationales have been offered, but one of the motives behind the doctrine 
may well have been apologetic: to defend against the charge that the Buddha was 
not omniscient. (That the Buddha intentionally remained silent on a number of 
key cosmological issues did not, in other words, bespeak his ignorance of said 
issues.) In any case, the Buddha’s alleged refusal to comment on the possibility of 
post-nirvāṇic existence was one response to the charge of nihilism, since it im-
plies that, contrary to appearances, nirvāṇa is not simply annihilation.
There were other wiggles as well, the most salient of which involved positing 
a state that so resembles nirvāṇa that the two are easily confused. This advanced 
meditative state, called nirodha-samāpatti (attainment of cessation) or nirodha 
for short, is insentience pure and simple.
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Nirodha, which simply means “cessation,” is an old concept that may have 
been widespread in the śramaṇic culture of the Buddha’s day. (In the later Yoga-
sūtras attributed to Patañjali, nirodha refers to the final goal of yogic practice: the 
eradication of the defilements and the end to the illusion of separation between 
self and absolute.)18 As part of his quest for enlightenment, the Buddha is said to 
have mastered the highest yogic techniques then available under the teachers 
Ārāḍa Kālāma and Udraka Rāmaputra.19 Later Buddhist exegetes organized the 
meditative attainments associated with these masters into a system of eight stages 
of trance or equipoise, four associated with the material realm (rūpa-dhyāna) and 
four immaterial absorptions or “attainments” (samāpatti). Ārāḍa Kālāma is said 
to have taught Siddhārtha the first seven stages, culminating in the “sphere of no 
conception” (ākiṃcanyāyatana), while Udraka Rāmaputra taught him the eighth, 
“neither conception nor non-conception” (naivasaṃjñā nāsaṃjñāyatana). The 
Buddhist scholastic tradition is generally clear that these rarified states of trance 
may be useful, particularly for those who aspire to supernormal powers, but they 
are not essential to the Buddhist path. It seems that one of the motives behind the 
systematization of these meditative states was to assimilate and subordinate, at 
one and the same time, the practices and teachings of rival ascetic traditions.20
In early Buddhist materials the term nirodha is more or less synonymous with 
nirvāṇa; nirodha regularly appears as a shorthand for the third noble truth 
(duḥkha-nirodha “cessation of suffering”), for example.21 But as the tradition de-
velops, nirodha takes on a second, more technical meaning; it now denotes an 
extraordinary state of meditative absorption, a ninth trance (or fifth samāpatti) set 
above the “sphere of neither conception nor non-conception,” in which, according 
to most accounts, all conscious activity is extinguished. In this state the ongoing 
continuum of mental factors is not merely inhibited or suppressed but, more rad-
ically, ceases altogether, if only temporarily. The only thing that distinguishes this 
state from death is that the physical body remains alive, sustained by the dharmas 
of “heat” (uṣman) and “vitality” (āyus).22
Having distinguished nirodha from nirvāṇa, scholiasts were free to contrast 
the two; they could argue that those who see the Buddha as preaching annihilation 
mistake the state of nirodha-samāpatti for nirvāṇa. Apparently, the mistake is 
easy to make: Buddhaghosa himself seems to consider nirodha phenomenologi-
cally close to, if not identical with, nirvāṇa. In his Visuddhimagga, in response to 
the question why an advanced practitioner would aspire to nirodha, he writes: 
“Being wearied by the occurrence and dissolution of formations, they attain 
[nirodha], thinking ‘Let us dwell in bliss by being without consciousness here and 
now and reaching the cessation that is nibbana.’ ”23
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Much has been written about nirodha, notably the fine study by Paul Griffiths 
(which builds on the work of Lambert Schmithausen).24 I will, therefore, forgo an 
extended treatment here, and simply confine myself to some of the conceptual 
puzzles entailed by this rather peculiar state.
There is no minimizing the philosophical and doctrinal problems that attend 
the notion of nirodha. The central teaching of Buddhism is precisely that all 
things arise due to causes, and that saṃsāra is sustained by—or better, coexten-
sive with—the psycho-physical continuum (santāna) of dharmas. Once the con-
tinuum of mental events ceases—once the chain is broken—it is difficult to 
account for its reappearance at a later point in time. (The insentient yogi certainly 
cannot will himself out of nirodha.) And what happens if someone dies in nirodha? 
Logically, you cannot be reborn, since there is no final moment of consciousness 
to impel a future birth. Thus death in nirodha should be tantamount to nirvāṇa 
without remainder. But the tradition is clear that nirodha is not nirvāṇa, and be-
sides, śamatha practices and states such as nirodha are not supposed to yield, in 
and of themselves, final liberation.
Different exegetical traditions responded to these conundrums in different 
ways. As to how one emerges from nirodha, Buddhaghosa states that the yogi, 
prior to entering nirodha, resolves to emerge after a specified period of time, typ-
ically seven days. (Buddhaghosa notes that the prudent yogi will take additional 
vows to emerge earlier should he be needed by the community or summoned by 
the master, lest he inconvenience anyone by his absence.)25 But the Theravāda 
commentaries fail to explain, from the standpoint of karma theory, how the vow 
works; it would appear that the effective force of the vow is extrinsic to the psy-
cho-physical continuum of the yogi. Meanwhile, some Sarvāstivādin exegetes 
such as Saṅghabhadra solve the problem through the signature Sarvāstivādin the-
ory that dharmas exist in all three periods of time, a theory that allows for causal 
continuity across the temporal gap. Since past dharmas continue to exist in the 
present (and future), and since there are no intervening moments of consciousness 
during nirodha, the last moment of consciousness prior to nirodha can be said to 
be the “contiguous” or “proximate” (samanantara) condition for the subsequent 
arising of mind that marks the end of nirodha.26
There were other theories as well. The Sautrāntikas, for example, held to the 
“mutual seeding” of mind and body, meaning that the karmic seeds of mental 
activity lie dormant in the physical body during nirodha. Advocates of the seed 
theory insist that this is, in principle, no different from the situation of the inhab-
itants of the formless realms, who eventually will be reborn in one of the lower 
realms of form or desire. Beings in the formless realms don’t have physical 
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bodies, so in order to give rise to one in a subsequent birth the “seeds” of the 
physical aggregate (rūpa-skandha) must have remained dormant in their mental 
continua during their formless existence. The Yogācāras appear to have built on 
this seed theory with their notion of the ālayavijñāna (store-house conscious-
ness).27 The unmanifest or noumenal ālayavijñāna, which persists during nirodha, 
stores all mental and physical karmic seeds, thus effectively eliminating the prob-
lem. Finally, Dārṣṭāntikas such as Vasumitra simply assert that conscious activity 
is not completely eliminated in nirodha; rather, some kind of “subtle thought” 
(*sūkṣmacitta) or “unmanifest thinking consciousness” (aparisphuṭamano-
vijñāna) persists throughout the comatose state.28
As for the problem of dying while in nirodha, various ad hoc solutions were 
proffered. Buddhaghosa says that before entering nirodha, the yogi must use his 
preternatural powers to determine the time of death, so as to ensure that he 
emerges before his allotted lifespan is up. Some commentators also hold that 
nirodha renders the body indestructible, and thus it is simply impossible to die 
while in nirodha. (Buddhaghosa cites the story of Mahā Nāga, who sat immobile 
in cessation while the building around him caught fire and burned to the ground. 
Mahā Nāga is embarrassed when he emerges several days later and is accused of 
being a “lazy monk”!)29 Finally, some traditions, including the Sarvāstivāda, hold 
that only noble ones (ārya) or an elite subset thereof are capable of attaining 
nirodha; spiritually undeserving worldlings (pṛthagjana) could not, therefore, use 
nirodha as a shortcut to nirvāṇa.30
It is clear that the concept of nirodha spawned a number of complex and 
somewhat exotic theories to account for the return of consciousness following its 
cessation. But putting such theories aside, I would ask: why did the Buddhists 
need such a nirodha in the first place? Why contrive a state that (1) seems so 
similar to nirvāṇa as to invite confusion, and at the same time (2) seems to violate, 
or at least threaten, the Buddhist understanding of cause and effect?
Might the uncanny similarity to nirvāṇa be precisely the point? The Buddhists 
were, in effect, saddled with a notion of nirvāṇa—extinction—that, however at-
tractive it may have been to an early tradition of forest-dwelling ascetics, ap-
peared to later audiences distressingly like an end to conscious existence. By 
devising a state that was almost, but not quite, identical to nirvāṇa, the Buddhists 
could argue that the desire for nirvāṇa was not, despite appearances, a desire for 
annihilation.
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Insentient Beings
In the Pāṭika-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, in a discussion of various theories of 
creation, we find to following curious passage,
There are, Bhaggava, some ascetics and Brahmins who declare that the 
beginning of things was due to chance. I went to them and asked them if 
this was their view. “Yes,” they replied. I asked them how this came about, 
and when they could not explain, I said: “There are, friends, certain devas 
called Without Conception. As soon as a perception arises in them, those 
devas fall from that realm . . .  remembering nothing they think: ‘Now 
from non-being I have been brought to being.’ That, Reverend Sirs, is how 
it comes about that you teach that the beginning of things was due to 
chance.”31
The “devas without conception” (asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ, asāṃjñika-deva, Pali: 
asañña-sattā-nāma-devā) mentioned here are a class of celestial beings that have 
no cognition or consciousness or sentience at all; Theravāda commentators con-
sider them “one-aggregate-beings” constituted by the material aggregate alone.32 
These rather odd creatures abide in one of the seven (or eight or nine) heavens of 
the “fourth dhyāna sphere” (caturtha-dhyāna-bhūmi), the highest of the four 
spheres of the realm of form (rūpa-dhātu).
Rebirth in the heavens of the fourth dhyāna sphere comes about through mas-
tery of the fourth dhyāna. While there are varying enumerations of the heavens of 
the fourth sphere, one common scheme places the Heaven of the Gods Without 
Conception together with (or as a subdivision of) the Heaven of Extensive Re-
wards (Bṛhatphalāḥ) in the lower strata.33 These two abodes are available to pṛ-
thagjanas (ordinary persons who have not yet attained the stage of ārya or noble 
ones) who may or may not have been followers of the Buddha-dharma. The re-
maining five heavens—Avṛhā, Atapā, Sudṛsā, Sudarśanā, and Akaniṣṭhā—are 
collectively known as the Pure Abodes (śuddhāvāsa) since, unlike the lower two, 
they are reserved for Buddhist non-returners (anāgāmin). The beings of the lower 
two heavens live for five hundred eons (kalpa), while those in the higher heavens 
live for anywhere from one thousand eons to, in the case of the gods of the 
Akaniṣṭha Heaven, sixteen thousand eons.34
The notion of an entire heaven consisting exclusively of mindless zombies, all 
of whom had previously mastered the absorption of non-consciousness (asaṃ-
jñi-samāpatti), raised similar issues to those that dogged the idea of nirodha: once 
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the continuum of consciousness has been severed, how does it get going again? 
And how is rebirth out of such an existence possible? Thus it is not surprising to 
find these states discussed together in the major compendia of the Sarvāstivāda 
and Yogācāra schools, including the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Mahāvibhāṣā śāstra, 
Nyāyānusāra, and Cheng weishi lun.
Such texts contain, for example, extended exchanges about whether the gods 
without conception are devoid of consciousness altogether, or whether, as some 
claim of nirodha, there is some residual or subliminal consciousness that persists 
some or all of the time. This issue constitutes one of the controversies addressed 
in the Kathāvatthu (3.11), where the Andhakas claim that some consciousness 
must exist, if only for a short time, at the beginning and end of one’s existence in 
the Heaven of the Gods Without Conception.35 In fact, most commentators agree 
that it is the eventual reappearance of consciousness in a mindless god that trig-
gers, almost but not quite immediately, rebirth back into the realm of form (kā-
ma-dhātu). The alternative scenario, namely, that of a god dying while still 
mindless and being reborn as a sentient being, would have engendered the same 
conundrum as death while in nirodha. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, for example, 
explains,
Question: Are the Non-Conscious Ones called this because they are al-
ways non-conscious, or are they sometimes conscious? Answer: They are 
conscious at birth and at death; they are called non-conscious because 
their consciousness is suspended for a very long time. When, after this 
long time, they produce a consciousness again, they die. As it says in the 
sūtra, “When they produce consciousness again, they die, like a person 
awakening after sleep.” Dying in the non-conscious heaven, they are nec-
essarily reborn in the realm of form and nowhere else. In fact, the force of 
asaṃjñi-samāpatti, by which these beings are born among the Non-Con-
scious Ones, is exhausted; they have not been in a position to practice 
asaṃjñi-samāpatti: hence they die, as arrows fall to the ground when their 
impetus is spent.36
This image of the arrow falling back to earth after its inertia is spent is also found 
in Buddhaghosa’s analysis of the mindless gods in his commentary to the Dīgha-
nikāya.37 This analogy may have been widely employed in attempts to escape the 
karmic conundrum, but it does not address the underlying problem, namely, in the 
absence of the conscious stream—in the absence of any aggregate other than that 
of form (rūpa-skandha)—what sustains or transmits this inertial mental energy? 
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That others insisted on alternative mechanisms, such as the persistence of some 
subtle consciousness while still in a mindless state, is evidence the problem is not 
ours alone.
While there was some agreement among Sarvāstivādin exegetes that there 
must be some moments, however brief, of consciousness at the beginning and end 
of one’s sojourn in this realm, the precise duration of these moments became a 
topic of some debate.38 But the Sarvāstivādins had another problem as well, 
namely, how to account for a state that is characterized primarily by an absence. 
The Sarvāstivādins held that all phenomena result from the interactions of dis-
crete and irreducible dharmas that persist through time, and thus if the existence 
of gods without conception is characterized by “mindlessness,” this mindlessness 
must, they reasoned, be the defining property of a unique dharma. So they were 
obliged to posit one.
Among the beings who take birth among the Non-Conscious Ones, i.e., 
the non-conscious gods, there is a dharma that arrests the mind and its 
mental states, and which is called “Non-consciousness.” By this dharma, 
the mind and future dharmas are, for a certain time, hindered from being 
produced and do not have the power to arise. This dharma is similar to 
what arrests the water of a river, that is, to a dike. This dharma is exclu-
sively the retribution of non-conscious absorption (asaṃjñi-samāpatti).39
Such a mechanism or dharma was required to account for (1) the state of “non-con-
ception” (āsaṃjñika) of the mindless devas, (2) the “absorption of non-concep-
tion” (acittaka-samāpatti, asaṃjñi-samāpatti) that gave rise to it, as well as (3) 
the attainment of nirodha. All three phenomena are characterized by mindless-
ness, and all are grouped together by Sarvāstivādins in the category of “condi-
tioned factors dissociated from thought” (cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra).40 In each 
case, the Sarvāstivādins (or at least the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas) associated the 
absence of cognition or mindlessness with an irreducible ontic entity; as Saṅgha-
bhadra writes, “apart from the moment of thought just prior [to cessation], there 
definitely exists a discrete dharma that is capable of obstructing mind.”41
While these three states would seem to be identical with respect to their con-
tent, namely mindlessness, they are each associated with their own individual 
dharma. Collett Cox explains,
These factors all do the same thing—they obstruct thought—but they are 
“distinguished by their location, the practitioner who produces them, their 
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intended purpose, and so on . . .” For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, this 
activity entails the obstruction of both the single thought factor (citta) that 
demarcates each moment of the mental stream and the simultaneous and 
associated thought concomitants (caitta) that represent the various mental 
events operating in each moment.”42
Logically, these rather unusual dharmas belong neither to the domain of mind nor 
to the domain of form, which is why they end up placed among the aforemen-
tioned “conditioned factors dissociated from thought.”
Many Buddhist scholiasts found this an unwarranted reification. Mindless-
ness could be explained adequately, they felt, by reference to what happens imme-
diately preceding such a state—there was simply no need to associate the ensuing 
absence of conception with a discrete dharma. Thus Vasubandhu regarded all 
three states of mindlessness as simply “provisional designations that describe the 
condition of the non-operation of thought (apravṛttimātra); they do not exist as 
real entities.”43
Putting aside, once again, these rather involved debates, we are prompted to 
ask, why did the Buddhists need the mindless gods in the first place? Were there 
not enough Buddhist heavens already? Why complicate things with a heaven that 
would further rattle their understanding of karma and rebirth?
As for the origins of the Heaven of the Gods Without Conception, the Pāṭi-
ka-sutta cited above suggests one theory, according to which the mindless gods 
are invoked to explain the heterodox belief in creatio ex nihilo. As creation from 
nothing is, according to the Buddhists, prima facie irrational (“I asked them how 
this came about, and . . .  they could not explain”), the notion must persist due to 
the testimony of those who, in their previous life, were mindless gods and thus 
cannot recollect their previous state: “ ‘There are, friends, certain devas called 
Unconscious. As soon as a perception arises in them, those devas fall from that 
realm . . .  remembering nothing they think: ‘Now from non-being I have been 
brought to being.’ That, Reverend Sirs, is how it comes about that you teach that 
the beginning of things was due to chance.” This ingenious if fanciful explanation 
for the heretical belief in creatio ex nihilo suggests an early association, at least in 
the minds of scholiasts, between mindlessness on the one hand, and simple inex-
istence (nihilum) on the other. I will return to this below.
Whatever the origins of this cosmological oddity, the exegetical tradition was 
drawn to the mindless gods not because of their role in perpetuating a spurious 
creation myth, but rather by the question of how they lost their minds in the first 
place. As mentioned above, the denizens of the fourth dhyāna sphere were all 
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previously masters of the fourth dhyāna. But the fourth dhyāna sphere is comprised 
of multiple heavens; why are some born in one heaven and some in another?
The answer lies in the differences in the manner of their yogic attainment—
the use of different meditation objects or techniques, for example, or differences 
in the practitioners’ intentions or motivations (chanda). We have seen that only 
pṛthagjana—yogis who have not yet attained the stage of the noble ones—are 
reborn among the mindless gods, while the higher heavens are reserved for Bud-
dhist ārya. But there is another thing the mindless gods have in common: they 
were all motivated to attain dhyāna by an aversion to sentient experience, and 
hence they intentionally cultivated the “absorption of non-conception” (asaṃ-
jñi-samāpatti). Due to their erroneous belief that conception is itself the cause of 
all suffering, and that the ultimate goal of yogic practice is a state in which there 
is no cognition, they engaged in practices designed to arrest all conscious activity 
and experience.
This explanation is found in works associated with virtually all of the major 
scholastic traditions. Buddhaghosa’s commentary to the Dīgha-nikāya, for exam-
ple, explains rebirth among the mindless gods as follows:
Someone who has gone forth in a non-Buddhist school does the prepara-
tory work [for jhāna], achieves the fourth jhāna, emerges and sees the 
fault in consciousness; he thinks, “When there is consciousness there is 
the pain of hands being cut off and all sorts of fears; enough of conscious-
ness, only the unconscious state is peaceful.” Once he has seen the fault 
of consciousness in this way, if he dies without having lost the jhāna he is 
reborn among the unconscious beings. With the cessation of the death-con-
sciousness his mind disappears from this world and only the physical ag-
gregate appears there [in the world of unconscious beings].44
The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya provides much the same account:
The ascetic falsely imagines that non-conception (āsaṃjñika), the 
non-conception that constitutes the result of the absorption of non-con-
ception, is true deliverance. . . .  This absorption is cultivated only by pṛ-
thagjanas, not by āryas. The āryas consider this absorption as a precipice, 
a calamity, and do not value entering it. On the contrary, pṛthagjanas 
identify non-consciousness with true deliverance; they have no idea of 
“going out” with respect to it; hence they cultivate the absorption that 
leads to it.45
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The Cheng weishi lun concurs:
As for the unconscious gods, they are born into that heaven through the 
power of their aversion to profane thought that attends their cultivation of 
the absorption [of non-conception]. Since the principle is the obstruction 
of the mental factors that are not perpetually active [i.e., all conscious 
activity except that of the ālayavijñāna and the manas] as well as the 
cessation of all conscious thought, they are called unconscious gods. 
Therefore, all six consciousnesses have been eliminated in them. . . .
The absorption of non-conception belongs to ordinary people (pṛ-
thagjana) who have subdued the craving of the Śubhakṛtsna [Realm—the 
highest heaven of the third dhyāna], but who have not yet subdued the 
defilements of the higher [realms]. Since their primary motivation is lib-
eration from conception, this causes the cessation of the mental factors 
that are not perpetually active as well as the objects of mind. Since the 
cessation of conception is foremost, it is called “without conception,” and 
since it renders the body serene and harmonious, it is also called 
“absorption.”46
This gets to the crux of the difference between the absorption of cessation 
(nirodha-samāpatti) on the one hand, and the absorption of non-conception 
(asaṃjñi-samāpatti) and the beings without conception (asaṃjñikasattvāḥ) on the 
other. Nirodha is reserved for noble ones (ārya) who, while free of aversion to 
consciousness, nevertheless seek a temporary respite from it. Although nirodha is 
not inimical to the Buddhist path, it is not essential either. In contrast, the mind-
lessness of the mindless gods comes about through a profound error: ignorantly 
believing that insentience is the goal, their meditation practice was directed to-
ward the cessation of consciousness rather than the cessation of saṃsāra.47
In short, Buddhist scholiasts needed not just one kind of mindlessness to con-
trast with nirvāṇa, but two: one (nirodha-samāpatti) which is acceptable if not 
laudable, and another (asaṃjñi-samāpatti) which is baneful.48 In both cases, a 
clear distinction was drawn between non-conception or insentience on the one 
hand, and true liberation on the other. But in conjuring states that look like nir-
vāṇa but are not, the tradition gerrymandered the soteriological landscape. The 
gerrymandering is evident in the topographical confusion that resulted. Note, for 
example, that asaṃjñi-samāpatti—the fourth-dhyāna absorption of non-concep-
tion that leads to birth as a mindless god—is, for all intents and purposes, phe-
nomenologically identical with nirodha; both entail the cessation of all conscious 
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activity. As we have seen, the similarities were appreciated by the exegetical tra-
dition. But this created a problem, namely, where to locate asaṃjñi-samāpatti 
among the hierarchy of dhyānic states, and where to locate the heaven of mindless 
gods in the hierarchal cosmology of the three realms.
There is a natural progression among the rūpa-dhyānas, with each successive 
absorption marked by the elimination of certain factors present in the previous 
stage. Thus in the first dhyāna the factors of investigation (vitarka), observation 
(vicāra), joy (prīti), happiness (sukha) and concentration (samādhi) are all active. 
The second dhyāna is characterized by the elimination of investigation and obser-
vation, leaving only joy, happiness, and concentration. In the third, joy drops 
away, leaving happiness and concentration, and in the fourth concentration alone 
remains. These rūpa-dhyānas are succeeded, in turn, by the arūpa-dhyānas, 
which continue the progression toward increasingly rarefied states until we reach 
a point when consciousness itself ceases completely: 
1: the abode of limitless space (akāśa-anantya-āyatana)
2: the abode of limitless consciousness (vijñāna-anantya-āyatana)
3: the abode of nothingness (akiñcanya-āyatana)
4:  the abode of neither conception nor non-conception (naivasaṃjñāna- 
asaṃjña-āyatana)
5: nirodha
Given the internal logic of the sequence, one would expect to find asaṃ-
jñi-samāpatti—the attainment of non-conception—located among the formless 
dhyānas, abutting nirodha perhaps. After all, in terms of content (or lack thereof), 
asaṃjñi-samāpatti appears to be identical with nirodha. But this would create an 
insoluble problem: with the noted exception of nirodha, each of the dhyānas has 
a corresponding heaven. Were asaṃjñi-samāpatti placed in the formless sphere, 
masters of this absorption would be born into a realm in which they lacked not 
only minds but bodies as well. And even the most adroit Buddhist exegete would 
have had a difficult time explaining that! So asaṃjñi-samāpatti had to find a place 
among the rūpa-dhyānas, and the mindless gods a corresponding heaven in the 
realm of form. Asaṃjñi-samāpatti is accordingly situated among the highest of 
the rūpa-dhyānas, but even then there is confusion, as the tradition could not 
agree on its precise geographical location; some texts situate it within the Heaven 
of Extensive Rewards (Bṛhatphalāḥ), while others see the two realms as distinct.
What are we to make of this? The tacit assumption among scholars seems to 
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be that the architectonic systems associated with Buddhist scholasticism are the 
products of obsessive literalists unable or unwilling to step beyond the confines of 
scriptural orthodoxy. But perhaps the architects of the system were not as slavish 
to tradition as some might assume. Perhaps the proliferation of bodies without 
minds and minds without bodies are better viewed as thought experiments bear-
ing on existential conundrums of inarguable import to the tradition: conundrums 
relating to insentience, death, nothingness, and nirvāṇa. Contemplating variant 
versions of mindlessness allowed them to refine their understanding of the path 
and the goal, and to rebut the charge of nihilism—the allegation that Buddhists 
preach mindlessness and that nirvāṇa is a mystification of insentience.
And this brings us to China and to Chan.
Terminological Confusions
The notions of non-conceptualization, cessation, and nirvāṇa are all inextricably 
tied to the seminal Buddhist doctrine of “non-self” (anātman). It is precisely be-
cause there is no permanent, unchanging, ontologically extant self or soul that the 
temporary cessation of consciousness in nirodha, and the permanent cessation of 
the aggregates in nirvāṇa, can be construed in positive terms. Buddhist practice, 
as depicted in the early textual tradition, is directed not toward the realization of 
some true self or transcendent other, but rather to the end of delusion. The notions 
of non-self (anātman), non-conception (asaṃjñā), cessation (nirodha), and nir-
vāṇa are all intertwined in complex and sometimes contentious ways.
The Buddhist tradition employed a host of terms in their technical analyses of 
self, consciousness, and personhood. Vijñāna, citta, saṃjña, and manas are 
among the Sanskrit terms commonly used for what we might call mind, con-
sciousness, cognition, or conception, for example, and “self” can be rendered, 
depending on context and ethical valence, as ātman, pudgala, or sattva. The dis-
tinctions among these terms are not always easy to parse, and there are inconsis-
tencies in usage across our sources.
As we move to China, the terminological complexity is exacerbated by the 
problem of translation and the profusion of alternative Sinitic renderings of key 
Indic terms. Some equivalences became somewhat standardized in mature Chi-
nese translations of South Asian sources: wuwo for anātman; miejinding for 
nirodha-samāpatti; wuxiang for asaṃjñā; and so on. But at the same time we find 
vijñāna, citta, saṃjña, and manas all rendered, in different contexts, as xin, for 
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example, and xin, xiang, and even shi are not consistently or clearly distinguished 
in commentarial materials.
The terminological confusion slips into havoc as we turn to indigenous Chi-
nese Buddhist exegesis on a term such as wuxin or “no mind”—a multivocalic 
term with roots in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist Chinese traditions. Much has 
already been written on the term, but given its relevance to the issues at hand a 
few words are in order.
One of the earliest appearances of wuxin is in Laozi 49, where it appears as a 
textual variant: “The sage is always mindless (wuxin); he considers the minds of 
the common people to be his own mind.”49 But the pre-Buddhist use of the con-
cept is more commonly associated with Zhuangzi, notably a passage in chapter 
12, “Heaven and Earth”:
Those who shepherded the world in ancient times were without desire and 
the world was satisfied, without action and the ten thousand things were 
transformed. They were deep and silent and the hundred clans were at 
rest. The Record says: “Stick to the One and the ten thousand tasks will be 
accomplished; achieve mindlessness (wuxin) and the gods and spirits will 
bow down.”50
Like the Laozi passage, Zhuangzi could here be understood as claiming that the 
sage has no desire, volition, or intentionality of his own; rather, he responds spon-
taneously to the needs of others. This is in keeping with the image of the sage 
emperors of old, who did not act (wuwei) yet ruled well; they did nothing, but 
nothing was left undone.51 “No mind” in such passages may simply refer to the 
absence of intention or desire or egotism, and there is little reason to equate it with 
insentience or unconsciousness.
However, in chapter 22 of the Zhuangzi there is a more intriguing passage, a 
song by Piyi:
Body like a withered corpse,
mind like dead ashes,
true in the realness of knowledge,
not one to go searching for reasons,
dim dim, dark dark,
mindless, you cannot consult with him:
what kind of man is this!52
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The notion of a mind “like dead ashes” comes closer to the notion of insentience 
proper, and, as we will see below, this caught the attention of later Buddhist 
commentators.
Turning to Buddhist understandings of wuxin, scholars often cite Sengzhao 
(374–414) as an influential early source on the subject. Unfortunately, although 
the term appears some fifteen times in his Collected Essays (Zhaolun), it is diffi-
cult to pin Sengzhao down on his understanding of the term; as is often the case 
with this author, the passages in question are susceptible to multiple, sometimes 
contradictory, readings. The following passage, from the essay Prajñā Has No 
Knowing (Banruo wuzhi lun), is typical:
Objection: Though the mind of the sage is without knowing, it does not 
err in its path of responding to situations. Therefore, it responds to what 
should be responded to, and leaves alone what should not be responded 
to. Consequently, the mind of the sage sometimes arises and sometimes 
ceases. How can this be?
Reply: “Arising and ceasing” is the arising and ceasing of mind. As 
the sage has no mind, how can arising and ceasing occur therein? Thus it 
is not that there is no mind, but only that his mind is without mind. Also, 
it is not that he does not respond, but only that his response is without 
response.53
Sengzhao may be echoing the ideal referenced in Laozi and Zhuangzi above, 
namely, that the sage has no intentions (or even agency) of his own; the sage re-
sponds spontaneously in accord with cosmic necessity. While Sengzhao’s writ-
ings are not always clear, here too there is little evidence that wuxin was understood 
as unconsciousness or insentience.
With the emergence of early Chan, however, the notion of wuxin is brought to 
the fore, along with a number of related and equally complex notions such as 
jueguan (severing discernment), linian (transcending thought), and wunian (no 
thought). While there is little consensus in our sources on the use and application 
of these terms—early Chan writers often champion one term as denoting correct 
practice while disparaging others—all these terms appear in discussions concern-
ing the relationship of means and ends in Buddhist dhyāna practice.54 And repeat-
edly, the controversies bear on the relationship between Buddhist practice on the 
one hand, and the simple insentience (wuqing) of the physical world on the other. 
This, I will suggest, gave rise to the Chinese Buddhist thought experiment par 
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excellence: the notion that insentient objects possess buddha-nature, become en-
lightened, and preach the dharma.
The Buddha-Nature of Insentient Objects
The medieval Chinese controversy concerning the buddha-nature of insentient 
objects (wuqing foxing) extended over several centuries and involved leading 
clerics from every major Chinese Buddhist tradition. The source materials are, 
accordingly, vast and complex. As I have written on the topic elsewhere, I will 
limit the discussion below to an overview of the key players, texts, and issues 
bearing on the debate.55
The roots of the doctrine are usually traced to the monk Daosheng (360–
434), who may have been the first in China to insist that all living beings, includ-
ing icchantika (yichanti), possess buddha-nature. This was an odd if not 
oxymoronic claim. Icchantika is a technical term for beings who lack the poten-
tial for buddhahood; they are, by definition, bereft of “buddha-nature.” Never-
theless, Daosheng’s controversial pronouncement was vindicated with the 
appearance of a new recension of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra in 421, which stated that all 
beings—including icchantika—possess buddha-nature and will eventually attain 
enlightenment. While this “northern-recension” of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra is cele-
brated as the earliest canonical sanction for the universality of buddha-nature, it 
clearly restricts buddha-nature to the sentient. In the oft-repeated words of the 
scripture, “ ‘Non- buddha-nature’ refers to insentient things such as walls and 
fences, tiles and stones. Everything apart from insentient things such as these is 
called ‘buddha-nature.’ ”56
More than a century later the monk Jingying Huiyuan (523–592) revisited the 
Nirvāṇa-sūtra’s position in the context of the relationship between “buddha- 
nature” and “originally pure mind.” Huiyuan approached the topic by distinguish-
ing between buddha-nature as a mode of cognition (“the buddha-nature that 
knows”) and buddha-nature as the metaphysical ground that makes such cogni-
tion possible (“the buddha-nature that is known”). The former, which is capable 
of awakening through the elimination of ignorance, is restricted to living beings; 
this, according to Huiyuan, is the referent of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra passage. The 
 latter—the “nature that is known”—is the dharma-realm itself, and thus it logi-
cally encompasses all things, both animate and inanimate.57
A similar strategy is found in the writings of the Sanlun exegete Jizang (549–
623). Following a Mādhyamika line of reasoning, Jizang argues that the 
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distinction between sentient and insentient cannot pertain at the level of ultimate 
truth.58 As such, if you deny buddha-nature to something,
then not only are grass and trees devoid of buddha-nature, but living be-
ings are also devoid of buddha-nature. But if you hold to the existence of 
buddha-nature, then it is not only living beings that have buddha-nature, 
but grass and trees must also have buddha-nature. . . .  If we understand 
that all dharmas are equal and do not view the two marks of the contingent 
and the absolute, then in reality there are no marks of attainment or 
non-attainment. Since there is no non-attainment, we provisionally speak 
of attaining buddhahood. Thus at the moment when sentient beings attain 
buddhahood, all grass and trees also attain buddhahood.59
Jizang is quick, however, to concede that this represents the perspective of “per-
vasiveness” (tongmen, i.e., absolute truth). From the perspective of “difference” 
(biemen, i.e., conventional truth), it makes little sense to speak of grass and trees 
actually attaining enlightenment.
Because sentient beings have mental delusions, they can attain awaken-
ing. Grass and trees have no mind, and thus they have no delusion. What 
would it mean for them to obtain awakening? It is like waking from a 
dream: if you are not dreaming, then you cannot wake up from it. There-
fore it is said [in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra] that since sentient beings possess 
buddha-nature they can attain buddhahood, but since grass and trees are 
devoid of buddha-nature they cannot attain buddhahood.60
This “two-truth” hermeneutic allowed scholiasts to affirm the universality of bud-
dha-nature while upholding (from a provisional perspective) the teachings of the 
Nirvāṇa-sūtra. Several other writers, including the Huayan patriarch Fazang 
(643–712) and the Tiantai patriarch Zhanran (711–782), adopted a similar tactic 
to defend the buddha-nature of the insentient. Zhanran, to pick but one example, 
writes, “The individual of the perfect [teaching] knows, from beginning to end, 
that the absolute principle is non-dual, and that there are no objects apart from 
mind. Who then is sentient? What then is insentient? Within the Assembly of the 
Lotus there are no differences.”61
While the treatment of the buddha-nature controversy by renowned monks 
such as Huiyuan, Jizang, Fazang, and Zhanran has been studied in some detail, 
less attention has been paid to the controversy as it appears in early Chan materials. 
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As it turns out, the buddha-nature-of-the-insentient doctrine surfaces in a surpris-
ing number of Dunhuang manuscripts, and it was evidently the focus of a passion-
ate (if not rancorous) debate among leading Tang Dynasty Chan prelates. This 
debate bore directly on the relationship between Buddhist practice, enlighten-
ment, ethics, insentience, and death.
The earliest reference to the topic in a Chan lineage text is found in the Record 
of the Masters and Disciples of the Laṅkāvatāra (Lengqie shizi ji) attributed to 
Jingjue (683–ca. 750).62 Here both the fourth patriarch Daoxin (580–651) and the 
fifth patriarch Hongren (601–674) are depicted defending the notion that insen-
tient objects not only possess buddha-nature but also “preach the dharma.” Hong-
ren, for example, says, “At the moment when you are in the temple sitting in 
meditation, is your body not also sitting in meditation beneath the trees of the 
mountain forests? Are earth, trees, tiles, and stones not also able to sit in medita-
tion? Are earth, trees, tiles, and stones not also able to see forms and hear sounds, 
wear a robe and carry a bowl? When the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra speaks of the dhar-
ma-body of the realm of objects, it [refers to] precisely this.”63 For both Daoxin 
and Hongren, the non-duality of the subjective and objective realms, as well as 
the Laṅkāvatāra doctrine that “all is mind,” lead directly to the inference that 
even the inanimate objects of our perception can be said to preach the dharma.
A more developed discussion of the doctrine can be found in a slightly later 
text, the Treatise on Severing Discernment (Jueguan lun), also found at 
Dunhuang,64
[The student] asks, “Is the Way found only in embodied spiritual entities, 
or does it reside in grass and trees as well?” [The master] replied, “There 
is no place the Way does not pervade.” Question: “If the Way is pervasive, 
why is it a crime to kill a person, whereas it is not a crime to kill grass and 
trees?” Answer: “Talk of whether it is a crime or not is a matter related to 
sentience and is thus not the true Way. It is only because worldly people 
have not attained the Way and falsely believe in a personal self, that their 
murder entails mental [intent]. This intent bears karmic fruit, and thus we 
speak of it as a crime. Grass and trees have no sentience and thus origi-
nally are in accord with the Way. As they are free of a self, there is no 
calculation involved in killing them, and thus we do not argue over 
whether it is a crime or not.
“Now one who is free of a self and is in accord with the Way looks at 
his own body as he would at grass or at trees. He treats the cutting of his 
own body as do trees in a forest. . . .”
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Question: “If grass and trees have long been in accord with the Way, 
why do the scriptures not record the buddhahood of grass or trees, but 
only of persons?” Answer: “They do not only record [the buddhahood] of 
persons, but of grass and trees as well. A scripture says, ‘A single mote of 
dust contains all dharmas.’ Another says, ‘All dharmas are suchness; all 
sentient beings are also suchness.’65 Suchness is devoid of any duality or 
discrimination.”66
This argument is a significant departure from the Mādhyamika-style arguments 
associated with the Sanlun, Tiantai, and Huayan writers mentioned earlier. Rather 
than insisting that, from the perspective of ultimate truth, there is no distinction 
between insentient and sentient, the Treatise on Severing Discernment argues that 
grass and trees have buddha-nature precisely because they are insentient. Being 
insentient they have no mind (wuxin) and thus no thought of “me” or “mine” and 
no fear of death. Insentient things are not only “in accord with the way” but they 
are de facto buddhas!
This innovative position seems to have been favored by masters associated 
with the so-called Northern and the Ox-Head lineages of Chan, masters who play-
fully proclaim that insentient objects “cultivate realization” and “become bud-
dhas.”67 It may thus be significant that one of the most strident critiques of the 
doctrine is found in the record of Heze Shenhui (684–758)—the de facto founder 
of the Southern school of Chan. In his Recorded Sayings he debates an Ox-Head 
master on precisely this point:
Chan Master Yuan of Ox-Head Mountain asked: “[You say that] bud-
dha-nature permeates all sentient things and does not permeate all insen-
tient things. I heard a venerable elder say:
Lush groves of emerald bamboos,
Are wholly the dharma-body.
Luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums,
Nothing is not prajñā (wisdom).68
Now why do you say that [buddha-nature] only permeates sentient things 
and does not permeate insentient things?” [Shenhui] answered: “Surely 
you do not mean that the merit of groves of emerald bamboos equals that 
of the dharma-body, or that the wisdom of clusters of chrysanthemums is 
the same as prajñā? If the groves of bamboos and chrysanthemums are 
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equal to the dharma-body and to prajñā, then in which sūtra does the 
Tathāgata predict that an emerald bamboo or a chrysanthemum will attain 
bodhi? The notion that emerald bamboos and chrysanthemums are the 
same as the dharma-body and prajñā is a heterodox doctrine. Why so? 
Because the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: ‘That which lacks buddha-nature is 
deemed an insentient thing.’ ”69
Shenhui is believed to have been instrumental in shaping the biography of the 
Sixth Patriarch and the Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing). 
As such, it is not surprising to find that surviving versions of the Platform Scrip-
ture also come out in opposition to the buddha-nature-of-the-insentient doctrine. 
This is clear from the “transmission verse” attributed to the fifth patriarch Hon-
gren, found near the end of the Dunhuang version of the text:
Sentient beings come and lay down seeds, 
And insentient flowers grow.
Without sentiency and without seeds,
The ground of mind produces nothing.70
Recall that, according to the Masters and Disciples of the Laṅkāvatāra, Hongren 
was a champion, rather than a critic, of the buddha-nature-of-the-insentient doc-
trine. But that did not stop the compilers of later versions of the Platform Scrip-
ture from altering the wording of the verse to make Hongren’s opposition to the 
doctrine even more explicit:
Sentient beings come and lay down seeds,
From the earth fruit is produced.
Without sentiency and without seeds,
There is no [buddha-]nature and nothing is produced.71
This position is endorsed by a number of figures associated with the early “South-
ern Chan” lineage. The second fascicle of Dazhu Huihai’s (dates unknown) Es-
sential Gateway for Entering the Way of Sudden Enlightenment (Dunwu rudao 
yaomen), for example, contains a number of exchanges on the topic,72 of which 
the following is typical:
Deluded people do not know that the dharma-body has no appearance, but 
manifests form in response to things. Thus they say that, “Lush groves of 
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emerald bamboos are wholly the dharma-body; luxuriant clusters of chry-
santhemums, nothing is not prajñā.” But if chrysanthemums were prajñā, 
prajñā would be the same as the insentient, and if emerald bamboos were 
the dharma-body, then the dharma-body would be the same as grass and 
trees. Then when people munch on bamboo shoots, they must be munch-
ing on the dharma-body. . . .
A master who lectured on the Huayan scripture asked: “Does the 
Chan Master believe that insentient things are the buddha or not?” The 
Master said: “I don’t believe it. For if insentient things were the buddha, 
then living people would be inferior to the dead. Even dead donkeys and 
dead dogs would be superior to a living person. A scripture says: ‘The 
buddha-body is precisely the dharma-body; it is born of the precepts, 
meditation, and wisdom; it is born from the three wisdoms and the six 
supernormal powers; it is born from all the excellent dharmas.’ If you 
claim that insentient things are the buddha, then were you, venerable one, 
to die right now, you would be a buddha.”73
Huangbo Xiyun (d. ca. 850) is yet another famous master who considered the 
notion that insentient objects have buddha-nature simply absurd. Huangbo is best 
known for his teaching that buddha and mind are one, and thus his opposition to 
the buddha-nature of the insentient logically follows: one can only ascribe bud-
dhahood to things that have minds.74
The position taken by these early Chan opponents of the buddha-nature of the 
insentient is straightforward. According to the classical Buddhist understanding 
of karma, only a sentient being can produce the kind of activity—the karmic 
seeds—that will germinate into bodhi. But this ignores the problem that sits at the 
very center of Buddhist soteriology, namely: How can any conditioned cause 
(karmic activity) ever give rise to an unconditioned effect (nirvāṇa)? And this, I 
believe, is what was driving the debate.
One Chan “solution,” already hinted at in the Masters and Disciples of the 
Laṅkāvatāra and developed in the Treatise on Severing Discernment, is to adopt 
a Yogācāra perspective, a “phenomenological” point of view that collapses the 
distinction between the knowing subject and the object that is known. At the same 
time, and again following Yogācāra precedents, one affirms the universality of 
buddha nature, such that the phenomenological realm is but an expression of the 
absolute. Here the identification of buddha-nature and mind, rather than support-
ing the distinction between the sentient and insentient, actually undermines it, 
since mind now subsumes the material realm. (In other words, “matter” is 
22289 22289
166 Robert H. Sharf
reinscribed as a series of perceptual events.) This seems to be the approach taken 
by the figure who, in the later tradition, is most closely associated with the bud-
dha-nature-of-the-insentient theory, Nanyang Huizhong (675–775):
A student asked: “Within the teachings of the scriptures one only sees 
sentient beings receiving the prophecy of future perfect enlightenment 
and then, at some future time, becoming a buddha named so-and-so. One 
never sees an insentient being receiving the prophecy of future perfect 
enlightenment and becoming a buddha. Among the thousand buddhas of 
the current bhadrakalpa, if there is a single case of an insentient object 
becoming buddha, please show it to me.” The Master said: “I now ask 
you, imagine a prince at the time of his coronation as king. Does the 
person of the prince receive the kingship [all at once], or must every 
territory in the kingdom be individually bestowed upon him?” [The stu-
dent] replied: “When the prince is crowned king, everything in the king-
dom becomes his. What need is there for him to receive anything else?” 
The Master said: “The present case is just the same: at the moment when 
sentient beings receive the prophecy of their future buddhahood, all the 
lands of the three-thousand great-thousand worlds are completely sub-
sumed within the body of Vairocana Buddha. Beyond the body of the 
buddha, could there still be some insentient object to receive the 
prophecy?”75 . . .
[The student] asked: “A venerable elder has said:
Lush groves of emerald bamboos,
Are wholly suchness.
Luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums,
Nothing is not prajñā.
Some people do not accept this teaching while others believe in it. The 
words are inconceivable, and I do not know what to make of it.” The 
Master said: “This pertains to the realms of great beings such as Samanta-
bhadra and Mañjuśrī; it is not something that lesser men are able to be-
lieve and accept. This teaching is fully in accord with the intent of the 
superlative scriptures of the Mahāyāna. Thus the Huayan Sūtra says: ‘The 
buddha-body fills the dharma-realm and manifests itself before all beings. 
It responds in accord with conditions, extending everywhere, yet it re-
mains constantly ensconced on the seat of bodhi.’76 As emerald bamboos 
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do not lie beyond the dharma-realm, are they not the dharma-body? More-
over, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: ‘Since matter is boundless, 
prajñā is also boundless.’77 As chrysanthemums are but matter, are they 
not prajñā?”78
Huizong cites the Huayan Sūtra notion that the phenomenal universe itself is the 
body of Vairocana Buddha in support of his claim that all things, including the 
insentient, embody buddha-nature and “preach the dharma.” This position would 
eventually win the day: in later gong’an materials, the inert silence of a staff or 
tree, rather than bespeaking the inconceivable absence that is insentience and 
death, is rendered the perfect expression of the selfless quiescence of no-mind.79 
“A monk asked Zhaozhou, ‘What is the meaning of the patriarch [Bodhidharma] 
coming from the west?’ Zhaozhou replied, ‘The cypress tree in front of the 
garden.’ ”80
Chinese Mindlessness
It may seem curious that the Chinese did not reference the rich Indian Buddhist 
discourse on nirodha, asaṃjñi-samāpatti, and the mindless gods as they pondered 
the buddha-nature of the insentient. But it should not be surprising: that the term 
mie was commonly used as a Chinese translation (rather than transliteration) for 
both nirodha and nirvāṇa blurred the distinction between the two. Discussion of 
nirodha-samāpatti in Chinese Buddhist treatises is uncommon, and when such a 
state is mentioned it typically appears in the context of supernatural attainments 
and powers. Note, for example, Xuanzang’s Great Tang Record of Western Re-
gions (Datang xiyu ji), where he reports coming across two arhats, each en-
sconced in a cave, who had remained in nirodha-samāpatti (miejinding) for more 
than seven hundred years. As the hair and beards on their immobile bodies con-
tinued to grow, monks regularly shaved them and changed their clothing.81
So while the Chinese showed little overt interest in the scholastic controver-
sies surrounding nirodha or asaṃjñi-samāpatti, they were, I am suggesting, just 
as invested as the Indians in the problem of nirvāṇa and its puzzling affinity to 
insentience. Indeed, the linguistic and cultural differences that made it difficult 
for the Chinese to negotiate the Indian scholastic terrain made it even more diffi-
cult for them to appreciate the underlying existential issues that galvanized the 
Indian debates. And so they had to come up with thought experiments—“intuition 
pumps”—of their own.
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In other words, the philosophical dilemmas that animated Indian theories of 
nirodha and the mindless gods—confusions about sentience, agency, death, and 
nirvāṇa—were the same dilemmas that energized the buddha-nature-of-the-in-
sentient debates in China. That there were so many approaches to the issues, 
and so little consensus, underscores the experimental character of this discourse. 
Note how many of our Chinese authors, including Shenhui and Huizong, honed 
their positions in response to the single adage: “Lush groves of emerald bam-
boos are wholly suchness; luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums; nothing is not 
prajñā.” Reference to this aphorism functions much like reference to a brain 
transplant or a Turing test in modern philosophical discourse: it is a point of 
common reference, encapsulating a complex set of epistemological issues and 
arguments, that serves as a springboard for analyses and debate. The probative 
and even playful nature of the debate is evident in the Treatise on Severing Dis-
cernment, to pick a single example, which argues that it is precisely because 
insentient things do not have mind that they can be considered buddhas. The 
Treatise on No Mind (Wuxin lun), another Dunhuang text that appeared around 
the same time as the Treatise on Severing Discernment, takes a similarly inno-
vative position:
Question: “The Reverend has already said that everything without excep-
tion is without mind, and thus trees and rocks are also without mind. But 
surely it cannot be the same for trees and rocks?”
Answer: “My mind that is without mind is not identical with trees or 
rocks. Why so? It is like a celestial drum which, although it also lacks a 
mind, spontaneously emits various marvelous teachings that instruct sen-
tient beings. Or it is like the wish-fulfilling gem that, although it also lacks 
a mind, is able to spontaneously produce various apparitions. My own 
absence of mind is just like that; although I am without mind, I am per-
fectly able to apprehend the true form of all dharmas, and, endowed with 
true prajñā, the three bodies have freedom and responsive functioning 
without constraint. Therefore the Ratnakūṭa-sūtra says: ‘In the absence of 
mental intention it is still manifestly active.’ How could this be the same 
as trees and rocks? Indeed, the absence of mind is precisely true mind. 
And true mind is precisely the absence of mind.”82
Here the Treatise on No Mind argues that “no-mind” does indeed refer to a kind 
of insentience—the absence of intention, mind, and consciousness. But this is not, 
according to the text, of a piece with the insentience of trees and rocks, since trees 
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and rocks are manifestly incapable of doing the sorts of things that animate things 
do. Rather, the text would have us consider the insentience of “supernatural” ob-
jects like celestial drums and wish-fulling gems; insentient things that have no 
mind or intention but are still capable (like us) of autonomous activity. In other 
words, the Treatise on No Mind is positing a medieval Chinese version of a 
 “hybrid”—a category of things that conflates or confutes the sentient/insentient 
distinction.
This is not to suggest that Indian and Chinese Buddhist conceptions of “mind-
lessness” never came into direct contact and dialogue. There is, to my knowledge, 
one documented instance, associated with the “Samyé debate” that supposedly 
took place between the Indian master Kamalaśīla and the Northern Chan master 
Moheyan in mid-eighth-century Tibet. In this exchange, as recorded in a Dun-
huang manuscript, Kamalaśīla critiques what he takes to be the Chan position, 
namely, that Buddhist practice is directed toward the elimination of thought and 
cognition. Kamalaśīla makes his point by polemically likening the goal of Chan 
to the mindlessness of the mindless gods:
[Kamalaśīla] further asked, “There are divine beings who [in their former 
life] suppressed all deluded conception, and as a result of their suppres-
sion of deluded conception attained rebirth in the Heaven of [Gods] With-
out Conception. [But we know that] such beings don’t attain the way of 
the Buddha, and thus it is clear that the elimination of conception is not 
the way to buddhahood.”
[Moheyan] respectfully replied, “Those divine beings posit the exis-
tence of both meditative discernments and paths of rebirth, and they grasp 
at the absorption of non-conception. It is precisely because of such de-
luded conceptualization that they are born into that heaven. If they could 
free themselves from [attachment to] the meditative absorption into 
non-conception, then there would be no deluded thought nor rebirth into 
that heaven. The Vajracchedikā-sūtra says, ‘To be free of all marks, this 
is called [the way of ] the buddhas.’ In what scripture is it said that free-
dom from deluded conception is not the way to buddhahood?”83
Kamalaśīla’s point is that to strive for no-thought, no mind, no conceptualization, 
is to be no better than the mindless denizens of the Heaven of Gods Without Con-
ception—beings who ignorantly mistake insentience for the goal of spiritual prac-
tice. Moheyan responds that it is precisely such ideas—ideas like a state of 
non-conceptualization, or a heaven wherein there are beings without 
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sentience—that keep people bound to saṃsāra.84 The goal of practice is to let go 
of attachment to any and all discursive formations, to abandon conceptualization 
altogether, to reach a state of no mind. Is this tantamount to insentience, as Ka-
malaśīla believed? The Chan tradition—the tradition that rose to dominate Bud-
dhism in China—was weaned on precisely this struggle.
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imported by Buddhism. The tortures perpetrated in these Buddhist hells are not yet so ex-
tensively described in Daoist works, but their eloquent names are listed as threats. 
3. Michel Strickmann, Mantras et mandarins: le bouddhisme tantrique en Chine 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 11. On karma in medieval China and related bibliography, see 
Livia Kohn, “Steal Holy Food and Come Back as a Viper: Conceptions of Karma and Re-
birth in Medieval China,” Early Medieval China 4 (1998): 1–34.
4. Stephen Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 198.
5. In that respect, Zhi Qian was inspired by two works translated a few decades earlier: 
the Xiuxing benqi jing (T. no. 184, vol. 3) and the Zhong benqi jing (T. no. 196, vol. 4). See 
Zürcher, “Buddhist Influence on Early Taoism.”
6. Teiser, The Ghost Festival, 198.
7. Lunheng jiaoshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), juan 6.
8. Laozi xiang’er zhu jiaozheng, ed. Rao Zongyi, 1956, rev. ed. (Shanghai: Shanghai-
gujichuban she, 1991), 24, trans. Stephen Bokenkamp, Early Daoist Scriptures (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 108.
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